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A Better Interpretation of "Special Needs"
Doctrine After Edmond and Ferguson
United States v. Miles, 228 F. Supp. 2d 1130 (E.D. Cal. 2002).
In 2000, Congress enacted the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination
Act,1 which requires convicted sex offenders and other felons2 to submit
DNA samples to the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), a national
database used to identify DNA evidence found at crime scenes.
3 Two
federal district courts have applied the Supreme Court's special needs
doctrine to determine whether the collection of samples from felons under
the DNA Act violates the Fourth Amendment, with different results. This
Comment argues that the debate over the constitutionality of the DNA Act
demonstrates that the Supreme Court's most recent interpretation of the
special needs doctrine is misguided.
Two recent cases, United States v. Miles4 and United States v.
Reynard,5 have reached different conclusions about whether the collection
of samples under the DNA Act violates the Fourth Amendment.6 The Miles
1. 42 U.S.C. § 14,135a (2000).
2. The DNA Act also applies to individuals convicted of murder, voluntary manslaughter,
kidnapping, robbery, and burglary, among other offenses. See id. § 14,135a(d).
3. See id. § 14,135a(b). The CODIS is actually a "distributional database" that coordinates
local, state, and national DNA gathering programs, and contains more than 2 10,000 profiles from
twenty-four states and the FBI. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE FBI's COMBINED DNA INDEX
SYSTEM PROGRAM 2 (2000), at http://www.fbi.govihq/lab/codis/brochure.pdf.
4. 228 F. Supp. 2d 1130 (E.D. Cal. 2002).
5. 220 F. Supp. 2d 1142 (S.D. Cal. 2002).
6. Other courts have addressed this question. See, e.g., Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72 (2d Cir.
1999); Boling v. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336 (10th Cir. 1996); Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556 (9th Cir.
1995); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1992); Kruger v. Erickson, 875 F. Supp. 583 (D.
Minn. 1995). However, those cases were all decided prior to the Supreme Court's decisions in
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000), and Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S.
67 (2001), and therefore are not relevant to my analysis of the current state of the special needs
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and Reynard courts agreed that the blood-sample extractions mandated by
the Act are warrantless searches lacking probable cause, and therefore
would be constitutional only if they fell under the "special needs" exception
to the warrant requirement.7 This exception holds that the government may
conduct a search without a warrant or probable cause "when special needs,
beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and
probable-cause requirement impracticable." 8 Both courts further agreed that
the Court's recent decisions in City of Indianapolis v. Edmona9 and
Ferguson v. City of Charleston° should be the guideposts for special needs
inquiry. The courts disagreed only on the outcome of that inquiry: Miles
struck down the DNA Act searches,
1 while Reynard upheld them.' 2
Part I of this Comment summarizes the special needs doctrine as
interpreted in Edmond and Ferguson; Part II offers an alternative approach
to the doctrine; and Part III applies that alternative approach to the CODIS,
concluding that the constitutionality of the CODIS should be evaluated
under the alternative doctrine.
I
In discussing the DNA Act searches, both the Miles and Reynard courts
relied on City of Indianapolis v. Edmond and Ferguson v. City of
Charleston.13 In Edmond, the Court struck down Indianapolis's highway
checkpoint program, under which randomly stopped cars were visually
inspected by officers and sniffed by narcotics-detecting dogs.' 4 Unlike
highway checkpoints with virtually identical effects upheld in earlier
cases, 15 Indianapolis's program was created for the "primary purpose [of
detecting] evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing."' 6 Thus, the Border
doctrine. Two additional cases on the constitutionality of the DNA Act have been decided since
Edmond and Ferguson, but those cases do not discuss either decision. See United States v. Meier,
CR No. 97-72 HA, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25755 (D. Or. Aug. 6, 2002); Groceman v. United
States Dep't of Justice, No. CIV.A.301CV1619G, 2002 WL 1398559 (N.D. Tex. June 26, 2002).
7. See Miles, 228 F. Supp. 2d at 1134; Reynard, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 1165; see also Skinner v.
Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989) (holding that taking a blood sample is a
search under the Fourth Amendment).
8. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Importantly, not every special needs search is constitutional. If the exception applies, the
court must then balance the nature of the privacy interest, the character of the intrusion, and the
nature of the government's concern to determine whether the search is reasonable.
9. 531 U.S. 32.
10. 532 U.S. 67.
I. 228 F. Supp. 2d at 1141.
12. 220 F. Supp. 2d at 1169.
13. Miles, 228 F. Supp. 2d at 1135-38; Reynard, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 1165-68.
14. 531 U.S. at 48.
15. Compare id. at 35-36, with Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447-48
(1990), and United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 545-47 (1976).
16. Edmond, 531 U.S. at41.
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Patrol could stop cars near the border, 17 and the police could stop motorists
for sobriety checks,1 8 because in both cases the searches were justified by a
primary purpose distinct from "general crime control ends," namely,
safeguarding the border and removing drunk drivers from the roads. But
because Indianapolis had conceded that its program "unquestionably [had]
the primary purpose of interdicting illegal narcotics,"'1 9 the program could
not be similarly justified.
In Ferguson, Charleston proved that it had learned from Indianapolis's
unwise concession in Edmond. Charleston argued that a public hospital's
policy of testing pregnant women for cocaine use had the primary non-law-
enforcement purpose of protecting the health of mother and child, and
therefore fell within the special needs exception.20 The Court nevertheless
struck down the program, concluding that while the "ultimate goal of the
program" may have been to get the women into treatment, the "immediate
object of the searches was to generate evidence for law enforcement
purposes in order to reach that goal.,
21
How did the Court distinguish the "immediate object of the searches" at
issue in Ferguson from the warrantless drug-testing programs upheld in
earlier cases? Here again, the Court defined the special needs category by
considering the primary purpose to which the government intended to put
the results of the search. Each of the earlier programs upheld by the Court
was justified by a purpose that did not involve arrest and prosecution:
protecting the integrity of the front lines in the war on drugs,2 2 gathering
reliable data on train accidents caused by substance abuse,23 or ensuring the
safety of high school students.24 The Charleston policy, by contrast, focused
on "the arrest and prosecution" of the drug-abusing mothers.2 5
Taken together, Edmond and Ferguson articulate a kind of evidentiary
approach to special needs analysis. In determining whether a warrantless
search falls under the special needs exception, the court asks, "What is the
primary purpose to which the government intends to put the results of the
search?" If the answer is simply, "to generate evidencefor law enforcement
purposes,'"2 6 then the exception does not apply. If, however, the government
17. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543.
18. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444.
19. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40. Because of this concession, the Court "express[ed] no view" on
whether an identical checkpoint program justified by "the primary purpose of checking licenses"
would be constitutional. Id. at 47 n.2.
20. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 73 (2001).
21. ld. at 83.
22. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656. 670 (1989).
23. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 620-23 (1989).
24. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
25. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 82 (citation omitted).
26. Id. at 83.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2003] 2593
The Yale Law Journal
can plausibly argue that it needs the search results primarily for something
other than criminal prosecution, then the special needs exception applies.
The Miles and Reynard courts faithfully applied this test in their
analyses of the constitutionality of the DNA Act searches. In both cases, the
government argued that the primary purpose of the searches was to create a
more accurate DNA database, which would assist law enforcement in
solving past and future crimes and thereby ensure a more accurate criminal
justice system. 27 The Miles court concluded that this purpose was
"indistinguishable from the government's basic interest in enforcing the
law," since the evidence was being used to solve and prosecute crimes.28
The Reynard court, on the other hand, found that "the creation of a more
accurate criminal justice system" was a purpose that went beyond "the
normal need for law enforcement.,
29
Thus, the debate between the Miles and Reynard courts over the
constitutionality of the DNA Act searches amounted to a semantic
disagreement over the meaning of "law enforcement purposes." 30 By
focusing their attention on whether the creation of a more accurate criminal
justice system is a "law enforcement purpose," both courts ignored many of
the central issues pertaining to the reasonableness of the DNA Act searches.
This definitional quandary, moreover, is inevitable under the special
needs test as articulated in Edmond and Ferguson. Those cases frame the
special needs inquiry in terms of whether the government's primary
purpose in obtaining the results of the search is law-enforcement-related. In
applying this test, lower courts faced with special needs arguments will
have to determine (1) whether a given purpose is non-law-enforcement-
related, and (2) if so, whether that is the primary purpose of the search.
But there are several reasons why these questions are not helpful in
determining whether warrantless searches are reasonable, which is, after all,
the point of the special needs exception. First, there is no reason to believe
that searches conducted primarily for non-law-enforcement purposes are
categorically more likely to be reasonable than law enforcement searches.
The Court has noted, "It is surely anomalous to say that the individual and
his private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only
when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior."3
27. Miles, 228 F. Supp. 2d at 1138-39; United States v. Reynard, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1167
(S.D. Cal. 2002).
28. 228 F. Supp. 2d at 1139.
29. 220 F. Supp. 2d at 1168.
30. At the end of its opinion, the Miles court noted, "The only difference between Reynard
and the court's decision here is that in Reynard the court concluded that the Act's goals of
ensuring accurate prosecution and creating a more complete DNA database were distinct from
general law enforcement objectives." 228 F. Supp. 2d at 1141.
31. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967) (applying the warrant requirement to
municipal housing inspections); see also Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 504 (1978) ("The
decisions of this Court firmly establish that the Fourth Amendment extends beyond the
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Second, the distinction between law enforcement and non-law-
enforcement purposes is not entirely clear. Most of the warrantless searches
upheld under special needs analysis had a law enforcement purpose in the
sense that they ultimately led to an arrest and/or criminal prosecution.
32
Conversely, nearly any law enforcement search could also be said to have a
non-law-enforcement purpose, since "law enforcement involvement always
serves some broader social purpose or objective. 33 Thus, most warrantless
searches will have both law enforcement and non-law-enforcement
purposes. Edmond and Ferguson suggest that a special needs search is one
in which the non-law-enforcement purpose is "primary," but offer little
guidance about how to distinguish primary from secondary purposes.
34
Third, the special needs test suggests that subjective intent is relevant to
the reasonableness of the search: "[O]ur special needs.. .cases
demonstrate that purpose is often relevant when suspicionless intrusions
pursuant to a general scheme are at issue. 35 But this approach is
inconsistent with the Court's holding in Whren v. United States that an
actor's motive does not "invalidate[] objectively justifiable behavior under
the Fourth Amendment. 36
II
The special needs doctrine as articulated in Edmond and Ferguson and
applied in Miles and Reynard asks an evidentiary question: Does the
government have a special (i.e., non-law-enforcement-related) need for the
fruits of the search? I propose that the special needs doctrine should instead
ask an administrative question: Does the context of the search at issue
paradigmatic entry into a private dwelling by a law enforcement officer in search of the fruits or
instrumentalities of crime."); William J. Stuntz, Privacy's Problem and the Law of Criminal
Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1017 (1995) ("[M]uch of what the modem state does outside
of ordinary criminal investigation intrudes on privacy just as much as the kinds of police conduct
that Fourth and Fifth Amendment law forbid.").
32. See, e.g., Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990); Griffin v. Wisconsin,
483 U.S. 868 (1987); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985); United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); cf Camara, 387 U.S. at 530-31 (stating that noncriminal searches
frequently have criminal consequences).
33. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84 (2001).
34. D.H. Kaye, The Constitutionality of DNA Sampling on Arrest, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 455, 496 (2001) ("[N]either Edmond nor Ferguson reaches the more vexing question of
what evidence can be used to infer purpose when the government contends that its immediate
purpose in instituting an investigative practice is something other than (or in addition to) pure
crime control.").
35. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47 (2000).
36. 517 U.S. 806, 812 (1996); see also Edmond, 531 U.S. at 52 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
("Once the constitutional requirements for a particular seizure are satisfied, the subjective
expectations of those responsible for it, be it police officers or members of a city council, are
irrelevant."); George M. Dery 1II, A Deadly Cure: The Supreme Court's Dangerous Medicine in
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 55 OKLA. L. REV. 373, 410 (2002).
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create a special need for warrantless searches? When the government
conducts business-as-usual crime fighting, the Fourth Amendment requires
that searches and seizures be based on individualized suspicion.
37 But when
the context of the search differs from everyday police work, the government
may be able to articulate a special need for warrantless searches, even if its
primary purpose in obtaining that evidence is prosecutorial.
Thus, school searches fall within the special needs exception because
the warrant requirement is unsuited to the school environment. Requiring
teachers, who are not familiar with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, to
obtain a warrant before searching a student "would unduly interfere with
the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in
the schools." '38 Similarly, warrantless stops near the border are permissible
on the ground that a warrant requirement "would be impractical because the
flow of traffic tends to be too heavy to allow the particularized study of a
given car." 39 Likewise, suspicionless drug testing of railroad employees
immediately after an accident is necessary because the delay required to
obtain a warrant would destroy much of the toxicological evidence the
government needs to determine whether the accident was drug- or alcohol-
related-again, an administrative consideration.40 And so on.
The administrative interpretation of the special needs doctrine suggests
that the Edmond highway checkpoint program was unconstitutional
because, with the narrow exception of border searches, 4' highway
checkpoints cannot be justified by an administrative special need. Drug
couriers are the targets of everyday law enforcement. Their illegal activities
are supposed to make them susceptible to apprehension through ordinary
law enforcement methods. The suspicionless searches at the highway
checkpoints were simply a shortcut around these methods.
The key fact in Ferguson was that law enforcement and city
prosecutors were involved in the hospital's drug-testing program from its
inception--deciding who would be tested, how and when the tests would be
conducted, and even establishing a chain of custody for the evidence.
42
Unlike the drug tests of railroad employees (upheld in Skinner) or high
37. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978) ("[T]he mere fact that law enforcement
may be made more efficient can never by itselfjustify disregard of thc Fourth Amendment.").
38. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985).
39. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557 (1976).
40. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 623 (1989).
41. Border searches are necessary "because of national self protection reasonably requiring
one entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come in, and his belongings as effects
which may be lawfully brought in." Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925). The heavy
flow of traffic at the border makes a random search regime the only way to administer such
searches. But this administrative need does not extend to highway checkpoints outside the border
search context. See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 56 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("I rather doubt that the
Framers of the Fourth Amendment would have considered 'reasonable' a program of
indiscriminate stops of individuals not suspected of wrongdoing.").
42. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 82 (2001).
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school students (upheld in Earls), the drug tests in Ferguson were not
administered by officials unfamiliar with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
Nor was there any danger, as in Skinner, that evidence would be lost
because of the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, since the women were in
the hospital for an extended period to give birth. The involvement of police
and prosecutors in the administration of the program has constitutional
significance, not because it reveals a primary law enforcement purpose, but
rather because it suggests that, as in Edmond, the warrantless search
program was nothing more than a police shortcut.
This brief account of the Court's recent cases suggests that, under the
administrative interpretation, the special needs doctrine would likely apply
when (1) the search is administered by non-law-enforcement officials; (2)
the delay necessary to obtain a warrant would result in the loss of evidence
or otherwise frustrate the purpose of the search; or (3) the context in which
the search is conducted necessarily requires randomness, for example
because of the sheer number of searches involved.a3
III
Does the context of the searches conducted pursuant to the DNA Act
create a need for a warrantless regime of searches? The benefit to innocent
persons of an accurate DNA database suggests that the answer is yes.
One reason suspicionless searches are disfavored under the Fourth
Amendment is the burden such searches place on innocent persons.44 Under
a suspicionless search regime, innocent persons are inconvenienced and
intruded upon in a way they would not be if the government were required
to obtain a warrant based on individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.
Consequently, if a suspicionless search regime has important collateral
benefits to innocent persons (beyond the generalized benefit of better law
enforcement, which would exist in any search regime), those consequences
are a good argument in favor of the constitutionality of the searches.
The Miles court quickly dismissed the benefit to innocent persons of an
accurate DNA database, noting that "[ijf a convicted felon wants to be
exonerated of a crime for which he is wrongly accused, he will presumably
submit voluntarily to a DNA test."'45 But the court ignored the important
benefit to a wrongly accused person of a database that would eliminate him
as a suspect, not by ruling him out, but by incriminating someone else. For
example, if two or more individuals commit a crime, but only one leaves
43. This list is meant to be illustrative (rather than exhaustive) of the kinds of administrative
reasons that would justify a special needs exception.
44. See Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent,
81 MICH. L. REV. 1229(1983).
45. Miles, 228 F. Supp. 2d at 1139.
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DNA evidence at the crime scene, the fact that my DNA does not match the
evidence does not eliminate me as a suspect. But if that evidence, through
the CODIS, incriminates another person whom I have never met and to
whom I have no connection, I have received an important collateral benefit
from the suspicionless search regime necessary to implement the CODIS.46
The point here is that whether or not the maintenance of a DNA
database for the purpose of exonerating innocent persons is properly
characterized as law-enforcement-related, that benefit simply cannot be
achieved without a regime of warrantless searches. If the government had to
obtain a warrant before conducting DNA Act searches, the CODIS database
would likely fail. The government would not be able to establish probable
cause for the vast majority of the searches, and would not go to the trouble
of getting so many warrants even if it could. The warrantless searches
mandated by the DNA Act are not merely law enforcement shortcuts.
Rather, they are a necessary precondition to the maintenance of a DNA
database, which has an important value to innocent persons. Therefore, the
administrative interpretation suggests that the DNA Act searches should be
evaluated under the special needs exception to the warrant requirement.
There are, to be sure, important arguments against the constitutionality
of the CODIS. First, given the massive amounts of information about an
individual that can be revealed through DNA analysis, the extraction of a
DNA sample can be an extraordinarily intrusive search. If a searchee could
show that the Act's disclosure limitation requirements were insufficient or
ineffectively implemented, a court might conclude that the burden of the
search outweighed the benefits. Second, the burdens and benefits of the
suspicionless searches at issue here are disproportionately distributed. The
burdens of the DNA Act searches are most likely to fall on convicted
criminals, a politically powerless group, while the beneficiaries are the
members of society at large. These considerations, though, seem most
relevant at the second stage of the special needs inquiry-the balancing of
the privacy interests at stake against the nature of the government's
concern. My point here is not to establish the constitutionality of the DNA
Act, but rather to argue that my proposed interpretation of the special needs
doctrine suggests that the Act should be evaluated under that doctrine. The
DNA Act does fall within the special needs exception, not because its
primary purpose, immediate need, or ultimate objective is non-law-
enforcement-related, but because in the context of the searches at issue, the
government has important administrative reasons for needing a warrantless
regime of searches.
-Jonathan Kravis
46. See Akhil Reed Amar, A Search for Justice in Our Genes, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2002, at
A31.
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